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Political changes which took place at the end of century made necessary formation of principally new regional security system in the Post-Soviet Central Asia. From a part of huge, politically, economically and ideologically homogeneous state, was being cut off from the external world by "iron curtain", this region, due to its key strategic situation and vast supplies of raw materials, has turned into an independent by its importance subject of geopolitics, becoming, at the same time, a sphere of interests for such external forces, as China, EU, Iran, Russia, Turkey, USA and others. The combination of internal and external problems, which have arisen before Post-Soviet Central Asia, requires new approaches to safeguarding of its security on that, in its turn, stability of a situation far outside the region depends.
The borders between Central Asian States constitute one of the key factors for regional security. From previously nominal administrative lines, were dividing Soviet republics, they have turned into major attribute of the state sovereignty, considering in many cases as the most important barrier against external threats of both military, and non-military origin. These borders remain, however, transparent, which makes them permeable for different kind of illegal transborder flows.
Demand for creation of effective regional security system in the Post-Soviet Central Asia induces the corresponding states to close cooperation, including transborder interaction in fields of economics, maintaining law and order, culture, ecology and other spheres. It is also necessary to overcome (at least partially) painful consequences of break of economic, communicational, cultural and other ties were existed in the Soviet period, due to which presently contiguous areas, nowadays having the frontier status, before the collapse of USSR often functioned as one system. The more and more important motive that stimulates development of transborder cooperation is also necessity of protection against threats connected to use of new borders transparency by transnational extremist and criminal groupings. Solution of numerous border problems presupposes development of cooperation between Central Asian and neighbor states, their frontier regions and local areas.
The phenomenon of transparent border is complicated sufficiently and therefore it requires a separate research work for its analysis. This phenomenon is very characteristic for transitional periods with the processes of either liquidation of internal boundaries during integration and, as a rule, simultaneous strengthening of this formations external borders (EU), or, on the contrary, disintegration of such formation with gradual reinforcement of its internal and weakening of external borders (CIS). In any case, such boundary zones are distinguished by fragmentariness of border control; liberal enough legal regime, regulating stay of other states citizens; favorable sociocultural background (language, common cultural heritage), due to which representatives of a neighbor country are not at all perceived as "aliens etc.
The phenomenon of border transparency in the context of security is frequently characterized by means of functional approach. In this case border security could be defined as maintenance of frontier states, administrative regions and, other involved subjects interests which are connected to functioning of border regime. According to the authors classification, in such context constituting and regulative functions of border have the main significance. The sense of these functions consists in the following:
Constituting function gives to the states territory certain formal framework, establishes precisely the limits of its sovereignty and provides, at the same time, effect of this sovereignty in these limits. In this case, threats to border security are connected mainly to territorial problems in relations between neighbor states.
In the case of Central Asia such problems are more or less actual practically for each frontier, that divides countries of the region from each other and from their nearest neighbors. Being established in the periods of the Russian empire and later USSR, these boundaries were determined by real balance of powers (as it took place in mutual relations of Russia or Soviet Union with their southern neighbors - Iran, Afghanistan, China), or by administrative decisions from above.
First of all, it concerns administrative borders between the Soviet republics of Central Asia which were established at 20-30-s. Kazakhstan was the first of currently independent Central Asian states that received (in 1920) relative autonomy primarily by the name of Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic of Soviet Russia. The following more important step in field of division into districts was national-state delimitation (razmezhevanie), was carried out in 1924. As a result, .Uzbek and Turkmen Union republics, Tajik Autonomous republic and r-Kirghiz Autonomous region (in 1926 transformed into Kirghiz Autonomous republic) were formed. In 1929 Soviet Tadjikistan, in 1936 - Kazakhstan and Kirghizia acquired the status of Union republics.
The new administrative division signified itself transition from territorial to ethnic principle of state formation in Central Asia. For realization of national delimitation the Commission for division of Middle Asia into districts was formed. In 1920-s it made a huge work, was collecting information about ethnic composition of the region. However, because of this tasks difficulty, very short terms for its realization, and in many cases of political reasons, the administrative decision proved to be far from optimum taking into account landscape, historical and ethnocultural features of the region. We should remember, at the same time, that these dividing lines were intended for administrative-territorial formations within one country, but by no means of future independent states which will base their legitimacy on nationalist ideology.
These considerations could be the most clearly illustrated by the example of delimitation of the Fergana valley, which territory was divided between Kirghiz, Tadjik and Uzbek Union republics. Quaint border lines in combination to numerous enclaves made inconvenient and in some cases impossible transport communication between different parts of the same republic without crossing another one. Because of weakening and followed disintegration of USSR, consequences of such delimitation made the Fergana valley one of the most conflictogeneous areas of Central Asia.
When the process of new Central Asian republics' formation was completed, less significant changes of borders were made during the entire Soviet period. These changes and transfers of territories from one republic to another were initiated by central authorities and, as a rule, were connected to optimization of frontier territories economic specialization for state, republican or local needs. Sometimes these changes were very serious. For example, extensive territories (about 60 thousand km2) of Kazakh-Uzbek borderland according to some sources of information were four times transferred from one side to another (2). Russia-Kazakhstan and other administrative borders of the region were subjected periodically to similar changes. At a local level the lines of delimitation were often a product not of administrative demarcation, but of needs of neighbor farms, the borders between which were frequently marked simply by plough and could be specified by mutual consent.
It is no wonder, that during weakening of the Soviet Unions central power, that legitimized existed boundaries and restrained actualization of latent contradictions, and then after occurrence of the new states, which are based their legitimacy on nationalist ideology, these contradictions have become aggravated dramatically. Already in 1990 in frontier Kyrgyz area of Osh the clashes between the Uzbeks and Kirghizes, were resulted to numerous human victims, occurred.
Due to Uzbekistans and Kazakhstans leaderships that conflict was succeeded to be localized, but ethnoterritorial contradictions were remained. Different experts number from 58 up to 130 disputable areas of border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (3). As well, there is a great number of disputed areas in Uzbekistan-Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan borderlands. In this connection, mutual accusations of neighbor states in illegal usage of their territories by another part, in violation by it of the state sovereignty became to be a common place.
After the invasion of islamists to the territory of Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and then - of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2000, the latter, being the main target for extremists, has quickened the process of its borders delimitation and demarcation. While corresponding relations with Turkmenistan were settled in September, 2000 on the basis of a bilateral agreement (4), which became the first one of such sort was made by Central Asian countries, the problems of defining its borders to other neighbors are sometimes solved by Tashkent unilaterally, by means of moving its border in a favorable direction and even mining some disputable areas, as it was, for example in the case with Kyrgyzstan (5). The process of Russia-Kazakhstan borders delimitation goes on more constructively. It is carried out since 2000 by the bilateral commission was specially formed on the basis of the interstate agreement.
The next, regulative function of border means establishment of such border regime that seems to be optimal both for states security and transborder cooperation. Formation of independent states and new economic ties instead of old, emergence of new threats to security, which have transnational nature, increases importance of borders as a "filter" for transborder flows. In these conditions the fact of "new" borders existence is ever less perceived only as a some conventionality, a cost of "sovereignization" process; as positive and negative aspects of border transparency or hardening of border regime have often a very serious effect on development of cooperation and security of Central Asian states. Such ambiguity of the role of regulative function is reflected in its following most important attributes:
- Barrierness, which protect a state against direct (penetrating to its territory) influence of external threats. Now this function acquires special importance in view of that Central Asian borders are more and more often regarded as a "weak link" in context of protection against illegal transborder flows like extremist armed groupings, smuggling of arms, drugs and strategic raw materials, illegal migration, etc.
In this case, the function of barrier can be carried out by different factors, on the base of which it is possible to distinguish landscape (natural obstacles), communication (weakness of the system of transborder communication ways), administrative (institutes or laws which complicate transborder interaction), ethnocultural ( distinctions that create unfavorable or alien ethnocultural environment for the majority of neighbor state's representatives), political (unfavorable political background in relations between contiguous states) and economic (difference in economic regimes of neighbor countries or such economic order which complicate transborder interaction ) barriers.
The majority of Central Asian borders has strong enough landscape barrierness, passing through lifeless deserted zones, or mountain areas, including high-mountainous zones where in winter temperature reaches -40ºC. Such situation seriously complicates creation of effective border protection system, complicating, as well, development of transborder cooperation, favors to knowing area potential infringers, creating for them propitious conditions for avoiding border control.
Among the Post-Soviet Central Asian borders Russia-Kazakhstan boundary (which pass mainly through steppe areas with small quantity of natural bars) has the weakest landscape barrierness. Relatively favorable landscape conditions for crossing of borders exist in the Fergana valley - the area of the most complex in Central Asia social and political conditions, where borders of three states - Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan are bound rather quaintly.
Strong enough landscape barrierness of Central Asian borders plays ambiguous role in modern conditions. On the one hand, it complicates development of transborder cooperation, making more difficult transborder communication and in many respects promoting (as in cases of Uzbekistans borders) establishment of a rigid border regime with its wide opportunities of administrative arbitrariness in regulation of transborder flows. However, landscape barrierness is not a serious bar against illegal transborder activity (first of all narcotraffic) and illegal armed formations, that events, were occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999-2000-s, showed very evidently.
Even more serious obstacle for development of transborder cooperation is in communicational barrierness. In view of difficult landscape conditions, the amount of railroads and highways, which cross new Central Asian borders, in most zones is very small. As in the previous case, the least barrierness is characteristic for Kazakhstan-Russia border. Communication ways are passed through it not only connect important industrial centers of these two states, but also serve as ways, are connecting Central Asia to Russia and other European countries without practically no alternative corridors. Unfortunately, these very important and convenient ways are used today as key routes of narcotraffic, while according to common opinion for now only insignificant part of such smuggling is revealed.
In a number of cases the communicational barrierness of Central Asian borders complicates also communication between various territories of one state. In combination to landscape conditions the system of transport routes created in the Soviet period, sometimes practically compels a traveller to cross twice a border in order to reach a locality on the territory of the same country. Such situation takes place for example, in western and northwestern areas of Russia-Kazakhstan border, northern part of Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan border, in Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan borderland and especially in the Fergana valley and contiguous areas. It is more convenient, for example, to go from Tashkent to the valley through the territory of Tadjikistan, while the optimum route between the Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Jalalabad passes through Uzbek territory.
As a response for such restricting measures, neighbor sides construct new highways, increase using of minor earth roads in order to avoid crossing of state borders. The local population of border areas also uses actively roundabout ways. Even Uzbekistan proved to be able to control only highways while from 277 earth roads only 29 were taken under permanent control (6).
Hardening of border regime in such zones has a sensitive effect on economic and social situation at a contiguous side and creates serious problems at interstate level. There were already precedents of that how the difficulty of transborder transport interaction was used as a means of political or economic pressure on a neighbor party. Such measures as hardening of control over the process of peoples entrance and departure, transit passage of transport, were applied by countries (in particular, Uzbekistan) were dependent on water or power resources of contiguous states (Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan correspondingly). On the other hand, Kazakhstan, for example, in response to Uzbekistans "gas pressure" stopped in 2000 the transit of Uzbek trains through its territory under pretext of Tashkents debts. According to some analysts point of view, "the most dangerous threat to regional security" is exactly in such actions for strengthening of communication barriers (7).
. Administrative barrierness is connected, mainly, to creation of border regime. Some time after the disintegration of USSR the new states have accepted normative acts were regulating their state borders status, and then they have begun creation of frontier-guard and customs services. Gradual process of replacement of Russian frontier guards by Central Asian ones was launched at the former borders of USSR with Iran, Afghanistan and China. However Russian servicemen (the majority of them is already formed by representatives of Central Asian nationalities) still protect the most difficult areas of the former Soviet borders, especially a border with Afghanistan. For now the presence of Russian troops is objectively the main factor, that holds Talibs from invasion northwards.
Though the national boundary services were already created in 1993-94, the real process of arrangement of formerly internal borders began only at the end of 1990s. In 1997-98 Russia started the process of frontier guards' service creation and strengthening of customs at its border with Kazakhstan, justifying these actions by necessity of struggle against smuggling and illegal migration.
A little after Uzbekistan launched equipment of checkpoints and customs at its borders with other states of Central Asia, was restricting passport control and customs examination, speeding up (sometimes by unilateral order) demarcation with the purpose of legitimizing the territorial frameworks of its border regime. Moreover, Uzbekistan began to close by engineering constructions the passages at its border with Kazakhstan and mines some areas of its border with Kyrgyzstan.
After invasion of Islamic militants in Kyrgyzstan (1999) this process was intensified. It became obvious that because of border transparency and of that four of five Central Asian states territories adjoin such hearthlands of radical islamism as Afghanistan and Fergana valley, these invasions pose the threat of fast distribution of conflicts from one state to the entire region. The special attention was paid by Uzbekistan to strengthening of its border to Tajikistan (from which the invasion was undertaken). Bishkek has also paid primary attention for its Tajik border and as a result in 2000 already 28 border control posts were existed (8).
The strictest measures were taken by Turkmenistan, which in 1999 extended visa regime on the other CIS countries, including Russia. Being the closest state in CIS, Turkmenistan made a next step in order to fence of undesirable influences from external world.
However, it seems to be evident, that despite of very serious motivation of these actions, they hardly can serve as a panacea from international extremism. Any Central Asian state neither technically nor financially is capable to ensure effective border regime that allows to create a real barrier against infringers, which can practically free bypass existing control posts. Some boundaries, in particular the Tadjik-Uzbek border, are actually not supervised. As a matter of fact, even major areas of Tadjik-Afghani and Turkmen-Afghani borders remain to be practically transparent. Even specially equipped customs' and border guards posts are far from to be always considered as serious barriers against illegal transborder flows. These posts have often a shortage not only of appropriate equipment and fuel for transport, but also of arms.
This situation is a source for anxiety both of authorities of Central Asian countries and of other states, having important geopolitical interests in the region. The most serious technical and organizational assistance for Central Asian border troops is rendered by Russia, which is still responsible for protection of the most intense areas of the former Soviet frontiers. Some technical and other help is given by USA and NATO. In 2000, for example, within the framework of the border security program United States rendered Kyrgyzstan financial assistance in volume of $ 3 million by equipment and educational preparation of frontier guards; for 2001 it is planned to render for the same purposes $ 2,5 million (9). Taking into account that effective arrangement of Central Asian borders requires some tens billions dollars, such help seems to be only symbolical.
Meanwhile, creation of common regional border security system, which would allow (at least, in some extent) to react to external challenges for regional security, becomes more and more necessary for stability not only in the region itself, but also far outside its limits. The question is not about the threats of militant islamism and aggravation of ethnic conflicts, but also about narcotraffic, the volume of that increased dramatically during the last decade.
Due to deterioration of socioeconomic situation, manufacture and distribution of drugs is now the most profitable kind of business both in some areas of the Post-Soviet Central Asia itself and especially in the neighbor Afghanistan, which since 1999 is the world leader on manufacture of drugs. The "Taliban" movement, which controls more than 90 % of Afghanistans territory, has turned quickly from declarative statements about its readiness to fight cultivation of narcotic cultures and manufacture of narcotic substances to support of such activity, which is taxed for financing of its military actions.
The basic routes of narcotraffic pass through Iran and Central Asia. Iran, however, undertakes very serious measures, was constructing a system of channels, concrete barriers, guard posts, watch towers and also a road along its entire eastern border, which is guarded by a corps of 30-thousands. The effectiveness of such system can be illustrated by the fact that in the world more than 80 % of confiscation of opium occurs in Iran (10).
Thus, transparency of the majority of Central Asian borders makes the northern route rather attractive. The basic ways of drugs transportation over the region pass through the borders of Afghanistan with Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan. According to all available information, only a small share of such revolution is revealed and this business is often patronized by high-ranking representatives of those services, which are intended for struggle against narcodealers. It is no wonder, therefore, that estimations for importance of narcotraffic routes, that pass through Central Asia, differ essentially. The common point of view assumes that the principal route passes through Tadjik Mountain Badakhshan (750-km. route Khorog-Osh), Khatlon region of Tajikistan and further - through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan for sending drugs in Russia and westwards. Some observers draws special attention for Turkmen route taking into account that Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border is now practically transparent. Because of extreme closeness of Turkmenistans political and information system one could only guess about the real volume of drugs are forwarded by this direction.
Some other challenges for regional transborder security are also connected to the problem of narcotraffic. The money received are used for financing of religious extremists activity, including "Taliban" and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) (11). Some of Kyrgyz colleagues told me that according to their opinions the attacks of islamists in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were connected, first of all, to desire to provide routes for transportation of drugs. Irrespective of that in what degree this statement is correct, the interrelation between the above-mentioned challenges for border security that require strengthening of border regime, is obvious enough.
On the other hand, hardening of such regime in many cases creates fertile ground for interstate and interethnic conflicts, strengthening political and ethnocultural barrierness. In the first case, the point is in some tendencies of deterioration of political background for transborder communication. All of Central Asian regimes are firmly authoritarian while potentially menacing to these regime tendencies from both within and outside are often rigidly pursued. It hampers integration from below", whether there are would be informal initiatives on strengthening transborder cooperation or attempts for creation of informal common information field. In many cases the serious importance the fears about strengthening of a neighbor countrys political influence have, especially when communities, prevailing in the contiguous state, live at corresponding frontier areas, as Russians and Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, Tadjiks in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan do.
However, a level of closeness of Central Asian states for external influence differs essentially. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain open enough that concerns, as well, regimes of their borders, Uzbekistan is oriented towards hardening of its corresponding regime, whereas in Turkmenistan both external contacts of its citizens and the order of stay of foreigners in the country are in most cases regulated very strictly.
Thus, political barrierness is closely connected to administrative one. This connection can be demonstrated by the cases of hardening border regime or other administrative-power actions, were taken in frontier areas because of worsening political conjuncture in interstate relations. As it was already pointed out, such measures were used as the instrument of pressure during solution of the questions are connected to payment for and distribution of raw resources. Several times military pressure was used, for example, in conflict between Tashkent and Bishkek for water resources. Uzbekistan undertook, in particular, such demonstration actions, as movement of its paratroops to the border Kampyrabad reservoir, as well as military exercises in this area.
Perhaps, the most painful problems of transborder (including interstate) relations in Central Asia are created by ethnocultural barrierness. At first sight, the level of such barrierness in current social conditions of Central Asia is relatively low: the population of frontier areas is often mixed, and traditions of interethnic contacts have been developed there for a very long historical period. Besides, the process of formation of modern Central Asian nations were created artificially in the Soviet period is still far from being completed: tribal or territorial loyalty often appears to be more important than national-ethnic one. It doesnt mean, however, absence of ethnocultural barriers (language, customs, perception of other ethnic groups etc.), which do not coincide frequently to political-administrative borders. This situation is aggravated by that the official policy of new statehood's building is based ideologically upon nationalism that assumes actually self-determination of title ethnic groups, prevalence of the corresponding languages, some traditions and norms within the limits of all state territory.
As a Tajik researcher Saodat Olimova pointed out, there are now two main paradigms of civil identity which are based on ethnic and territorialcivilizational belonging: the first one prevails among so-called title peoples of Central Asia (except the inhabitants of old civilizational centers), in particular at the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, whereas the second one is the most overspread among the inhabitants of old civilizational centers on the territory of Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan. By Olimovas opinion, in case of further barrierization of borders between national states a conflict between two kinds of identity: namely ethnonationalism that is supported at official level and "ancient regional consciousness which does not recognize new borders and new identities" is rather probable. These considerations are illustrated by clashes between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks in the Osh region of Kirghizia in 1990 and also by interethnic tension in relations between Kazakhs and Uzbeks in the Chimkent area of Southern Kazakhstan (12).
Additionally, the serious potential for transborder conflicts is created by consequences of migration processes of the Soviet and Post-Soviet periods. Even before the disintegration of USSR administratively encouraged settling of Kazakhstans northern areas by Russians and representatives of other Slavic ethnic groups with purpose of these territories economic development borderland, as well as "diffusive" migration of Kazakhs to contiguous areas of Russia were and are distinguished by higher level of life, was occurred in the Kazakhstan-Russia borderland. As a consequence, both parties are afraid of strengthening irredentist sentiments, that sometimes are used as a pretext for barrierization of border. Considerably more intense situation at Tajik-Uzbek border was created by civil war in Tadjikistan and by Tajik migration to the neighbor Uzbekistan, some territories of which, including such major historical-cultural centers, as Bukhara and Samarkand, are the main objects of Tadjik nationalists territorial claims.
In the opinion of Russian journalist and analyst Igor Rotar, today Central Asian islamists try to use in every possible way divergence of political-administrative borders from ethnocultural ones. They direct their attacks to disputable territories, are being objects of claims for title ethnic groups of neighbor countries: to Osh area of Kyrgyzstan (in that there are numerous Uzbek and Tadjik minorities) and Surkhan-Darya region of Uzbekistan (13). It is possible to dispute the thesis about such premeditation of actions on the part of forces declaring the purpose of creation in Central Asia a single Islamic state. However explosive consequences of these actions, including strengthening of suspiciousness among ethnic groups, which traditionally confess a moderate sort of Islam, to others, supposedly "pro-wahhabi" ones, are evident.
Another, possibly no less explosive consequence can be in above-mentioned aspiration of some states to create an effective system of border security having defined precisely the frameworks of their territorial sovereignty. As the latter is legitimized by nationalism, the existence of numerous diasporas in frontier zones creates fertile ground for irredentist conflicts (first of all in borderlands of Uzbekistan with Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan; the latter two ones with Afghanistan and also of Kazakhstan with Russia), which in a number of cases could transform into interstate collisions. The extreme complexity of establishing many territories ethnic origin hampers delimitation which is therefore sometimes postponed.
When ethnocultural barriers in Central Asia in most cases do not coincide to state borders, the economic barrierness as a rule is definitely connected to national economic system and territorial frameworks of its action. Disintegration of USSR has resulted in gradual destruction of previously single economic space, including introduction of national currencies, establishment of customs, reorientation of foreign trade activity to the third countries. Some attempts for economic reintegration and creation of new integration structures within the framework of CIS, Central Asian Economic Community, ECO and other unions faces insufficient economic potential, serious distinctions in interests of member states and their unwillingness to connect themselves rigidly by obligations on execution of agreements, which are accepted by coordination bodies. As a result, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan, alongside with Russia and Byelorussia, are the members of the (Eurasian economic community (former Customs Union) Union while Uzbekistan together with Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan created alternative organization of GUUAM and Turkmenistan distances itself from participation in these organizations, preferring to build the appropriate policy on the basis of bilateral agreements. Such discrepancy of external economic and connected foreign policy interests in some cases proves to be rather unfavorable background for transborder economic cooperation. It can be illustrated by measures were undertaken by Kazakhstan with respect to Kyrgyzstan which in 1999 joined the World Trade Organization. These measures were characterized by Kyrgyz president Akaev as "economic blockade and trade war inside the Customs Union" (14).
A barrier for transborder communication is often in rather essential distinctions in economic policies were spent by countries of the region. When Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have headed for liberalization of economy, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan keep rigid state regulation, including control above the prices and rates of a currency exchange. In spite of that in all these cases aspiration to encourage development of foreign economic relations is declared, such closeness of national economic system creates serious problems for development of transborder cooperation.
In fact, the main barrier for such cooperation is in economic weakness of involved parties. The opportunities for investment in economy of neighbor countries are not great (at the same time, competition for attraction of foreign investments is rather rigid), and volume of foreign trade revolution in many cases is insignificant because of limitation of demand for frequently rather similar assortments of production, which can be offered by another party. In some more great extent, financial difficulties hamper embodiment of some serious projects of cooperation at regional and local levels.
Economic weakness quite often becomes the reason for building of administrative barriers. As a result, the Post-Soviet Central Asian countries broke repeatedly the agreements that were signed within the Customs and Central Asian unions by introducing of restrictions on import of goods were made by other of the same organizations members.
Despite existence of numerous border barriers, development of transborder cooperation in region is certainly the necessary precondition for maintaining of regional security. In this context, the most important is the contact function of border, ensuring a regime of communication, that is favorable for establishment of mutually beneficial economic, political, cultural and other ties to contiguous territories. High level of such communication could become the most powerful stimulus for creating effective system of security, which should be initiated not only from above, but also from below, at a local level.
A special position in the rank of establishments intended for development of regional cooperation Central Asian economic community, which till 1999 was called Central Asian Union, has. Within the framework of this organization, cooperation in economic, social, cultural, legal, military, ecological and other fields is carried out. The stress on safeguarding of regional security last years becomes more and more pronounced in the framework both of this organization and of bilateral cooperation of Central Asian states. In rank of corresponding agreements a special emphasis is made on inviolability of state borders and aspiration to render to other parties a help in protection of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, struggle against terrorism and smuggling (15).
Because of Talibans military successes and intrusions of islamists on the territory of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999-2000, the military cooperation between Central Asian states and Russia (which have bound to each others by the Treaty about Collective Security) has intensified. As a demonstration of seriousness of Russian Federations strategic interests in region it is possible to consider sharp declarations, were repeatedly made by Moscow in address of Taliban as well as joint military exercises, like The Southern Shield maneuvers which were spent in spring of 2000 with participation of Russia and all states of region except Turkmenistan.
Apart from Russia, the power that has significant military and political opportunities for assistance for Central Asian countries in field of regional security is NATO. Since 1994, all states of region, except Tadjikistan, are participating in the "Partnership for peace" program. The most important direction of such cooperation is rendering by NATO technical and organizational assistance for creation of national armed forces, adequate to first-class standards. It is supposed, that these forces should be capable to participate in peacekeeping operations on settlement of ethnic conflicts. In order to train such forces, the "Centrasbat" international exercises with participation of Kazakhstans, Kyrgyzstans and Uzbekistans divisions are carried out regularly. From the party of NATO the most active contribution in formation of Central Asian armed forces is made by USA, Germany and Turkey.
Interaction between Russia and NATO, which are the powers are capable by their potential to make the most important contribution to strengthening Central Asian security system, is complicated by that enlargement of military-political presence of one part is often perceived in the light of geopolitical rivalry. Till now, this situation sometimes is regarded through the new great game" paradigm that was rather popular in the 1-st half of 1990-s. According to this kind of ideas, the rivalry for filling the Central Asian geopolitical vacuum should be finished by victory of some actors (among them were mentioned at first Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, USA) with essential weakening of others influence.
By significant part of Russian analysts and politicians strengthening of USA or NATO influence in Central Asia is considered as aspiration to oust Russia from the sphere of its geopolitical interests, which are important in the light of its national security On the other hand, minimization of Moscows influence in Central Asia sometimes is considered nearly to be the basic condition for security, the main threat of which is supposedly in "restoration of the Soviet empire" or creation a block under Russian control.
In view of increasing threat to stability of situation, expansion of religious extremism and distribution of ethnic conflicts, appeals to ousting any of above-mentioned powers, playing serious stabilizing role in region, seem to be simply short-sighted. On the contrary, gravity and scale of challenges to regional security, disregard of which can result in negative consequences far outside the region, require immediate joining efforts of all interested parties. The competition of external forces for influence in Central Asian region should be carried out in system frameworks with exception of steps that could destabilize a situation. All powers, which have essential geopolitical interests in Central Asia, should be aware clearly of that in the present conditions security of the region is exactly the main priority, which importance is higher than all other interests are taken together.
At the same time, the main role in solution of regional security problems, including security of borders, should be played by Central Asian countries themselves. It is worth to ascertain again that such solution is possible only on the basis of cooperation between them. In this connection reasonable the statement of G.Gleason is seems to be very reasonable The costs of failure to cooperate are high while the rewards of success are great. The American researcher remarks, - If the states succeed in establishing a new level of cooperation, they will reinforce their own sovereignty. But if inter-state cooperation continues to prove elusive, the problems of border disputes, trade and payments, common infrastructure arrangements, trans-border natural resources, intra-regional migration, terrorism, and trafficking in people, narcotics and weapons, will increasingly circumscribe the autonomy of the states. In the short-run, it will be easier to withdraw into self-protection and self-reliance than to cooperate with neighbors(16). Only development of regional cooperation with assistance and participation of other powers, which are interested in safeguarding stability in Central Asia could be relatively effective solution for those problems, which are in the long term can have a serious effect far outside the region.
NOTES
[1] Supported by the Research Support Scheme program of George Soros Foundation.
[2] Narymbay, Ermek. Zadachi vneshnei politiki Kazahsnogo gosudarstva v Srednei Azii (v razreze kazahsko-uzbekskogo pogranichnogo voprosa) (Tasks of Foreign Policy of the Kazakh State in Central Asia (in Light of the Kazakh-Uzbek Border Question). -http://www.navigator.kz/articles/together110400a.shtml.
[3] Mambetaliev, Kuban. Problemy kirgizsko-uzbekskoi granitsy v osveschenii SMI Kirgizii (Problems of the Kirghiz-Uzbek border in reports of Kyrgyzstans MASS-MEDIA). In: Mnogomernye granitsy Tsentralnoi Azii. Moscow: Gendalf, 1999. http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/04am/toc.asp; Rotar, Igor. Uzbekskie islamisty ne sobirayutsya ogranichivatsya sverzheniem Karimova? (Uzbek Islamists are not going to limit themselves by overthrow of Karimov?) - Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2000, 28 September.
[4] See: http://jahon.mfa.uz/News/2000/09/prs2309.htm.
[5] Rotar', Igor. Op.cit.
[6] XXI vek (XXI century). 1999, 4 March. - http://ftp.eurasia.org.ru/99/ archives/march/analitic/Vnp0188.htm.
[7] See, for example, in: Rajabov, Mahmadali. Problemy obespecheniya regionalnoi bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii na poroge XXI veka (Problems of maintenance of regional security in Central Asia on the eve of XXI century). - http: // www.navigator.kz/index.shtml.
[8] Nezavisimaya gazeta. Moscow, 2000, 11 October.
[9] "Kabar" Information Agency (Kyrgyzstan). - http://www.icb.kg/december/7_december/centrasia.htm.
[10] See in: Olcott, Martha; Udalova-Evart, Natalya. Narkotrafik na Velikom shelkovom puti: bezopasnost Tsentralnoi Azii (Narcotraffic on the Great Silk Road: Security in Central Asia). Moscow: Gendalf, 2000, p. 7.
[11] According to official sources in Kyrgyzstan, this organization in spring of 2001 was renamed to Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT) and creation of Islamic caliphate in Central Asia was proclamed to be its purpose. [12] According to statement of the Movement's leaders Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldash, now IMT includes all of radical Islamic organizations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Area of China. In: Nezavisimaya gazeta. 2001, 29 May, p.5.
[13] Olimova, Saodat. Natsionalnye gosudarstva i etnicheskie territorii (National States and Ethnic Territories). In: Mnogomernye granitsy Tsentralnoi Azii. Moscow: Gendalf, 1999. http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/04am/default.asp?n=toc.asp)
[14] Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2000, 28 September. - http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-09-28/5_scenario.html.
XXI vek (XXI century). 1999, 4 March.. - http://ftp.eurasia.org.ru/99/archives/march/analitic/Vnp0188.htm.
[15] See, for example, in: Dogovor o vechnoi druzhbe mezhdu Respublikoi Kazahstan i Respublikoi Uzbekistan ot 31 oktyabrya 1998. (The Treaty on eternal friendship between Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Uzbekistan of October 31, 1998). Gosudarstvennaya granitsa: sbornik normativno-pravovyh aktov. Almaty, "Daneker", 2000, pp. 113-115.
[16] Gleason, Gregory. Hardening of Borders calls for Greater Central Asian Cooperation. - Biweekly Briefing. August 2, 2000. - http://www.cacianalyst.org/August_2/HARDENING_OF_BORDERS.htm).
Copyright 2002 Center for Regional and Transboundary Studies at Volgograd State University
Copyright 2002 Sergey Golunov
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